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1 Introduction
Matching markets are two-sided markets, where agents on each side of the market have
preferences over matching with agents on the other side. For example, students are
allocated to schools, venture capitalists choose which start-ups to fund, social interactions
lead individuals to find marital partners, production tasks are assigned to workers, kidneys
are matched with dialysis patients, and auctions sort buyers with sellers. While the
economic theory of matching models has been around for more than five decades, it is
only recently that there has been a growing interest in the empirical models of matching
(Chiappori and Salanié, 2016).
One of the predominant strands of the literature focuses on the econometrics of one-
to-one matching models with transfers1 when the analyst has data on one large market
(e.g., Choo and Siow, 2006; Graham, 2013; Dupuy and Galichon, 2014; Galichon and
Salanié, 2015; Fox, 2018). Many empirical applications can be studied in this frame-
work, e.g., sorting of CEOs to firms (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008), sorting
of job openings to workers, and the marriage market (Choo and Siow, 2006; Hitsch,
Hortaçsu and Ariely, 2009; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss, 2017).2 In particular, Choo
and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2015) show that, if the agents belong to a
finite number of observed types, point identification of the systematic components of the
agents’ preferences (hereafter, preference parameters) is achieved under the assumption
that the probability distribution of the agents’ unobserved characteristics (alternatively
called taste shocks) is completely known by the researcher. In applied work, this typi-
cally amounts to fixing a parametric family for the taste shocks together with numerical
values for all of its parameters. However, such an approach may raise concerns because
parametric distributional assumptions on the taste shocks could overshadow the informa-
tiveness of the data. Therefore, our objective is to investigate identification and inference
of the preference parameters when the researcher does not impose parametric restrictions
on the probability distribution of the taste shocks. Instead, we allow for the inclusion
of nonparametric distributional assumptions, like symmetric marginals, stochastic inde-
pendence of the agents’ types, and much more. We believe that performing this robust
identification and inference exercise is important because it permits the researcher to
epistemologically evaluate to what extent the empirical content of the model considered
depends on the distributional assumptions imposed on the taste shocks. This is crucial
to understand the sensitivity of empirical conclusions to the strength of the restrictions
placed on the agents’ unobserved heterogeneity.
Other papers in the literature examine identification in one-to-one matching models
1One-to-one matching refers to the case where each agent on each side can either be matched with
exactly one agent on the other side, or remain unmatched. In models with transfers agents can transfer
part of their utility to their matched partner without frictions.
2See Fox (2009) for a review.
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with transfers without incorporating parametric distributional assumptions on the taste
shocks (e.g., Fox, 2010; Fox, Yang, and Hsu, 2018; Sinha, 2018). Their arguments exploit
variation across many i.i.d. markets. As data on many i.i.d. markets may not always be
available, in our analysis it is sufficient to collect observations from one large market.
When the researcher has data on one large market only, not specifying the probability
distribution of the taste shocks raises the possibility of partial identification of the pref-
erence parameters. Consequently, this poses the challenge of tractably characterising the
region of preference parameter values that exhausts all the implications of the model and
data (i.e., the sharp identified set for the preference parameters), under various classes of
nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shocks. Our study aims to answer
this methodological question.
Constructing the sharp identified set for the preference parameters requires facing
two problems. First, for a given value of the preference parameters, the analyst has to
find a probability distribution of the taste shocks that yields that hypothesised value.
This amounts to solving an infinite-dimensional existence problem because every possible
probability distribution of the taste shocks is not finitely parameterised. Second, the
analyst should repeat the first step for every admissible value of the preference parameters.
Usually, this is done in the partial identification literature by generating a grid of points
to approximate the preference parameter space and then repeating the exercise of interest
for each grid point. The difficulty of implementing such an approach increases with the
size of the grid, which in turn, increases exponentially with the number of the agents’
types, hence leading quickly to a computational bottleneck.
We address the first issue by using Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2018) (also known
as PIES3) for both sides of the market. The theorem provides sufficient and necessary
conditions for the existence of a probability distribution of the taste shocks that yields a
given hypothesised value of the preference parameters. The sufficient and necessary con-
ditions constitute a linear system of equalities and inequalities, which is a tractable and
well-understood problem. We address the second issue by showing that the preference
parameter space can be ex-ante partitioned into a finite number of convex subsets such
that, for each subset, every value belonging to that subset gives rise to the same linear
programming problem defined in the first step. Therefore, the researcher has to solve
the linear programming problem only once for each subset. Overall, the procedure de-
signed allows to feasibly construct the sharp identified set for the preference parameters
under several classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shocks.
Moreover, after having reformulated the identifying restrictions as moment equalities, we
explain how inference on the sharp identified set for the preference parameters can be
conducted by applying a computationally tractable version of the profiled subsampling
technique illustrated by Politis and Romano (1994), Romano and Shaikh (2008; 2012).
3That is, Partial Identification by Extending Subdistributions.
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Simulations suggest that the model is informative about the sign of the preference pa-
rameters, under various classes of nonparametric distributional restrictions on the taste
shocks. In addition, under some such classes, we obtain relatively tight bounds. Simula-
tions also highlight that our procedure is useful to compare and contrast the identification
power of several nonparametric distributional assumptions across different data generat-
ing processes.
Further, the methodology developed enables the researcher to answer certain relevant
empirical questions. For example, one can test restrictions on the preference parameters
across two or more markets. In particular, we investigate if the variations in marriage
matching patterns observed over time in the U.S. are caused by changes in the agents’
preferences for education assortativeness,4 or by a shift in the proportion of educated
women. The application framework and the data are taken from Chiappori, Salanié, and
Weiss (2017). In contrast with that study, we proceed without relying on parametric
distributional assumptions for the taste shocks, and thus we get conclusions that are
possibly more robust. Under a symmetry restriction on the taste shocks, we are unable
to reject the null hypothesis that the matching preferences have been invariant over time.
Instead, when we impose stronger nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste
shocks, we reject such a null. The latter result concurs with the result in Chiappori,
Salanié, and Weiss (2017) and can thus serve as a nonparametric sensitivity check for
their conclusions.
This paper is related to the literature on the econometrics of matching models. The
literature is split into several strands depending on the preference structures of the agents
(transferable utility (TU) models, non-transferable utility (NTU) models, or imperfectly-
transferable utility (ITU) models); the maximum number of links an agent is permitted
to form across sides (one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many); and/or the assignment
allocation is centralised or decentralised. Seminal papers on TU matching models have
been cited earlier. Identification in the NTU framework has been studied by Sørensen
(2007), Dagsvik (2000), Menzel (2015), and Agarwal and Diamond (2017). The ITU
framework has been introduced by Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2018).
Moreover, the matching model we consider can be equivalently rewritten as two
one-sided multinomial choice models linked via market-clearing transfers (Galichon and
Salanié, 2015). Therefore, our project is related to the literature on nonparametric and
semiparametric identification of multinomial choice models, e.g., Manski (1975), Matzkin
(1993), and Fox (2007). Fox (2018) establishes point identification of the preference pa-
rameters in two-sided markets under the assumption that the taste shocks are exchange-
able and the availability of a continuous regressor with large support. Furthermore, in
the absence of a special regressor, Fox (2018) characterises an identified region (possibly,
4For example, positive assortativeness means that more (less) educated men want to match with
more (less) educated women.
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not sharp) that can be estimated. With respect to Fox (2018), we focus on the sharp
identified set for the preference parameters and thus obtain the tightest possible bounds
implied by the model. In addition, our procedure does not require exchangeability and
applies to various classes of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shocks.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on partial identification in applied
research (see Ho and Rosen, 2017 for a review) and to the literature on assessing the
sensitivity of empirical conclusions (e.g., Kline and Santos, 2013).
In what follows, Section 2 introduces the matching model. Section 3 develops iden-
tification arguments. Sections 4 illustrates the construction of the sharp identified set
through simulations. Section 5 discusses inference. Section 6 presents the empirical
application. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We focus on the empirical one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, as it
has been previously studied in Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2015).
Specifically, we consider one market composed of two sides. On each side there is a
continuum of agents. Every agent on each side has preferences over the set of all agents
on the other side. Further, every agent on each side can at most be matched with one
agent on the other side. We assume that utilities are transferable. Transfers act as prices
which are determined in equilibrium simultaneously with the match assignment such
that each agent maximises her own payoff and the market clears. The two sides of the
market are stochastically independent5 and the matching is frictionless. Many empirical
applications can be studied in this framework, e.g., sorting of CEOs to firms, sorting of
job openings to workers, and the marriage market.
For simplicity of exposition, we refer to the agents in the first side of the market as
men and to the agents in the second side of the market as women, but our results are
clearly not restricted to the marriage market. Let I be the set of men and J be the set of
women. We index individual men by i ∈ I and individual women by j ∈ J . The outside
option to remain unmatched is indicated by “0”, so that single agents are represented as
being matched with “0”. Lastly, we define I0 ≡ I ∪ {0} and J0 ≡ J ∪ {0}.
Each man i ∈ I is endowed with some characteristics, Xi, whose probability distribu-
tion is denoted by PX . Similarly, each woman j ∈ J is endowed with some characteristics,
Yj, whose probability distribution is denoted by PY . The supports of Xi and Yj are finite
and indicated by X and Y , respectively. As earlier, X0 ≡ X ∪ {0} and Y0 ≡ Y ∪ {0}. Xi
and Yj are typically called man i’s type and woman j’s type, respectively. The realisations
of Xi and Yj are observed by the researcher.
5This restriction is not crucial for our discussion and can be relaxed. See Footnote 12 in Section 3.1.
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Let Φ˜ij be the match surplus generated when the couple (i, j) ∈ I × J is formed. If
the couple (i, j) is of type (x, y) ∈ X × Y , then the match surplus is defined as
Φ˜ij ≡ Φxy + iy + ηxj, (1)
where Φxy is the type-specific match surplus and {iy, ηxj} are continuously distributed
taste shocks assigned to the agents by nature and whose realisations are unobserved by
the researcher. The payoffs that man i ∈ I of type x ∈ X and woman j ∈ J of type
y ∈ Y get when staying single are defined as
Φ˜i0 ≡ Φx0 + i0, (2)
and
Φ˜0j ≡ Φ0y + η0j. (3)
We denote the probability distribution of i ≡ (iy ∀y ∈ Y0) conditional on Xi and
the probability distribution of ηj ≡ (ηxj ∀x ∈ X0) conditional on Yj by P|X and Pη|Y ,
respectively. {i, ηj} are introduced to reconcile the mechanical predictions of theory and
the fuzziness of the actual data. For instance, with a supermodular match surplus, the
matching assignment should be exactly assortative, which is never observed in practice.
As in Dagsvik (2000), Choo and Siow (2006), and Galichon and Salanié (2015), the
latent heterogeneity in equation (1) does not consist of an ij-indexed term, say νij.
Instead, it is modelled through an additively separable term, iy + ηxj (hereafter referred
to as separability). This means that when the researcher observes man i ∈ I of type x ∈ X
matched with woman j ∈ J of type y ∈ Y , it could be because j has a strong unobserved
preference for men of type x, or because i has a strong unobserved preference for women
of type y. It could also occur because j has unobserved features that attract men of
type x, or because i has unobserved features that attract women of type y. However,
simultaneous sorting on unobservables is ruled out. For example, it cannot be that j has
some unobserved preference for unobserved features of i or vice versa. Ultimately, note
that the latent terms {iy, ηxj} contribute to the match surplus and not necessarily to the
preferences of a particular side of the market.
There are three main reasons for imposing separability. First, in the presence of
ij-indexed latent variables without bounded support, the model could predict strange
equilibrium outcomes, such as payoffs tending to infinity, no singles, and a match as-
signment almost based exclusively on the realisation of the taste shocks.6 Second, if
the agents had to choose from a continuum of potential partners, then the frictionless
6Menzel (2015) provides restrictions on the structure of the agents’ preferences that address similar
concerns arising in non-transferable utility matching models. However, it is not obvious that the same
insights can be applied to transferable utility matching models. Exploring this is outside the scope of
our current study.
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assumption would be hard to justify (Section 4.1.2 in Chiappori, 2017). Third, from
a technical point of view, separability allows to transform the present framework into
two one-sided multinomial choice models linked via market-clearing transfers, as shown
by Proposition 1 in Galichon and Salanié (2015). This alternative representation of the
problem guides the identification analysis, as explained in Section 3.
A competitive equilibrium of the model is characterised by a match assignment and a
match surplus sharing rule. A match assignment is a description of who is matched with
whom, and a match surplus sharing rule tells us how the total match surplus is divided
among the matched agents. Such division of surplus relies on endogenously determined
transfers ensuring that every agent maximises her utility and the market clears.7 As per
Shapley and Shubik (1972) in one-to-one matching models with transfers, a competitive
equilibrium coincides with a stable matching. That is, a competitive equilibrium is such
that no agent has an incentive to deviate from her current match.
In order to properly describe the equilibrium concept, we introduce the formal defini-
tions of match assignment and match surplus sharing rule. Let µ˜ij be equal to 1 if man
i ∈ I and woman j ∈ J are matched and zero otherwise. Let µ˜i0 be equal to 1 if man
i ∈ I is single and 0 otherwise. Let µ˜0j be equal to 1 if woman j ∈ J is single and 0
otherwise. The vector
µ˜ ≡ (µ˜ij ∀(i, j) ∈ I0 × J0 \ {(0, 0)}),
represents a match assignment. Let U˜i and V˜j be the payoffs gained by man i ∈ I and
woman j ∈ J under the match assignment µ˜. The vectors
U˜ ≡ (U˜i ∀i ∈ I), V˜ ≡ (V˜j ∀j ∈ J ),
represent a match surplus sharing rule and they implicitly embed transfers across the two
sides of the market.
Definition 1. (Stable matching) (µ˜, U˜ , V˜ ) is a stable matching if it satisfies three prop-
erties:
(1)
∫
J0 µ˜ijdPW = 1 ∀i ∈ I and
∫
I0 µ˜ijdPM = 1 ∀j ∈ J , where PM and PW denote the
total measure of men and the total measure of women, respectively.
(2) U˜i + V˜j ≥ Φ˜ij ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J , with equality holding if µ˜ij = 1.
(3) U˜i ≥ Φ˜i0 ∀i ∈ I, with equality holding if µ˜i0 = 1. V˜j ≥ Φ˜0j ∀j ∈ J , with equality
holding if µ˜0j = 1.
7A competitive equilibrium can be equivalently characterised by a match assignment and a transfer
scheme.
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
The first part of Definition 1 states that the match assignment is feasible in the sense
of one-to-one, that is, every agent on each side can either be matched with exactly one
agent on the other side, or remain unmatched. The second and third parts state that
there is no man and woman that can get a strictly higher match surplus by deviating from
their matches under µ˜. Moreover, a stable matching exists and is generically unique.8
Hence, from now on we will refer to it as the stable matching.
3 Identification
We assume that the market has already reached the stable matching. In other words,
as the researcher collects more data, the asymptotic fiction is that the researcher learns
more about the already established stable matching without altering it.
Let QM,i and QW,j represent the type of woman matched with man i ∈ I and the
type of man matched with woman j ∈ J , respectively, at the equilibrium. Let PQM |X
denote the probability distribution of QM,i conditional on Xi. Let PQW |Y denote the
probability distribution of QW,j conditional on Yj. We require the probability distribu-
tions {PQM |X , PQW |Y , PX , PY } to be nonparametrically identified by the sampling process.
Hence, we expect the researcher to collect aggregate data on matching patterns in one
large market. For example, it is sufficient to have a random sampling scheme in which
the researcher draws agents from each side of the market and records the matched types.
Lastly, we assume that the researcher does not observe equilibrium transfers. However,
our discussion remains valid when data on equilibrium transfers are available, in which
case we have additional information to incorporate in the analysis.
The parameter of interest for identification is the vector of type-specific match sur-
pluses,
Φ ≡ (Φxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y0 \ {(0, 0)}).
Indeed, identifying and conducting inference on Φ is essential to understand the relative
importance of the agents’ observed characteristics in determining the match preferences.
This can be useful, for example, to test if the agents’ preferences for assortativeness
change over time.
A critical result that our identification arguments rely on is Proposition 1 in Galichon
and Salanié (2015). This proposition is based on the separability assumption of the latent
terms introduced earlier.
Proposition 1. (Galichon and Salanié, 2015) Given the collection of primitives {Φ, PX ,
PY , P|X , Pη|Y } generating the stable matching (µ˜, U˜ , V˜ ), there exists one and only one
8For more details on existence see Shapley and Shubik (1972). Further, in a large market with a
continuum of agents on both sides, Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992) show generic uniqueness.
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pair of vectors
U ≡ (Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0), V ≡ (Vxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y),
such that
U˜i = max
y∈Y0
(Uxy + iy) ∀i ∈ I of type x ∈ X , ∀x ∈ X ,
V˜j = max
x∈X0
(Vxy + ηxj) ∀j ∈ J of type y ∈ Y , ∀y ∈ Y ,
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, Ux0 = Φx0, V0y = Φ0y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y .

Proposition 1 allows to rewrite the framework of Section 2 as two separate one-sided
multinomial choice models linked by market-clearing transfers implicitly embedded into
the vectors U and V . Indeed, Proposition 1 claims that the probability distributions
{PQM |X , PQW |Y } are as if generated by the following model:
QM,i = argmaxy∈Y0(Uxy + iy) ∀i ∈ I of type x ∈ X , ∀x ∈ X , (4)
QW,j = argmaxx∈X0(Vxy + ηxj) ∀j ∈ J of type y ∈ Y , ∀y ∈ Y , (5)
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, Ux0 = Φx0, V0y = Φ0y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , (6)
i|Xi ∼ P|X , ηj|Yj ∼ Pη|Y ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J , (7)
where “∼” denotes “distributed as” and the equality sign in front of the argmax operator
is because ties are zero probability events. Such alternative representation of the problem
is useful as it immediately suggests a way to investigate identification of Φ: the researcher
can study identification of U and V from (4) and (5) using various restrictions on P|X
and Pη|Y in (7), and then obtain identification results for Φ through (6).
Along these lines, Choo and Siow (2006) show that if Φx0 = Φ0y = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×Y9,
the taste shocks are i.i.d. Gumbel with scale 1 and location 0, and the taste shocks are
independent of the agents’ types, then Φ is point identified via standard Logit arguments
applied to each side of the market. The result is generalised by Galichon and Salanié
(2015) who prove that if P|X and Pη|Y are fully known, then Φ is point identified.
Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2015) highlight that point identifi-
cation of Φ crucially relies on the assumption that the conditional probability distribution
of the taste shocks is completely known by the researcher, a priori. It typically amounts
to fixing a parametric family for P|X and Pη|Y together with numerical values for all of
its parameters. This leads to obvious concerns because wrong specifications can induce
inconsistent empirical results, as widely documented by the econometric literature on
binary and multinomial choice models (e.g., Manski, 1975, 1985, 1988; Matzkin, 1992,
9Following the multinomial choice literature, these restrictions are location normalisations.
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1993; Fox, 2007). Therefore, our objective is to investigate identification and inference on
Φ when the researcher does not impose parametric restrictions on P|X and Pη|Y . At the
same time, we allow for the possibility to include nonparametric distributional assump-
tions like symmetric marginals, stochastic independence of the agents’ types, and much
more.
We believe that performing such an exercise (hereafter referred to as the nonpara-
metric exercise) is important because it permits to obtain more robust conclusions on Φ.
Moreover, it helps us to do an epistemological evaluation of how the empirical content
of the model depends on the way in which the analyst has parameterised the conditional
probability distribution of the latent variables.
Implementing the nonparametric exercise is non-trivial. Indeed, avoiding parametric
restrictions on P|X and Pη|Y raises the possibility of partial identification of Φ. Conse-
quently, this poses the issues of tractably characterising and conducting inference on the
sharp identified set for Φ (that is, the region of parameter values that exhausts all the
implications of the model and data) under various classes of nonparametric distributional
assumptions on the taste shocks. The next Sections 3.1 and 3.2 address the identification
challenge, while Section 5 discusses inference.
There are other seminal papers in the literature considering related econometric ques-
tions when the analyst has data on one large market. A first group of works focuses on
one-sided markets. For example, Manski (1975) and Matzkin (1993) show point identifi-
cation of the payoff parameters in a multinomial choice model by combining in different
ways the conditional i.i.d.-ness of the taste shocks, the presence of a continuous regres-
sor with large support, and an index structure or shape restrictions on the systematic
payoff components. Note that the model in Section 2 does not contemplate the possi-
bility of having a continuous regressor and does not impose an index structure or shape
restrictions on the systematic payoff components. Fox (2007) proves that the conditional
exchangeability of the taste shocks can replace the conditional i.i.d.-ness because it is
sufficient for the rank property to hold. More recently, researchers have started to extend
these results to two-sided markets, e.g., Fox (2018).
3.1 The sharp identified set for Φ
We start with introducing additional notation and then we define the sharp identified
set for Φ. Without loss of generality and to keep the exposition readable, let X = Y ≡
{1, ..., r} with r ∈ N and let Rr+1 be the support of i conditional on Xi and of ηj
conditional on Yj. Bearing in mind that in multinomial choice models what matters are
differences in utilities, let
∆i ≡ (i1 − i0, ..., ir − i0, i1 − i2, ..., i1 − ir, i2 − i3, ..., i2 − ir, ..., ir−1 − ir),
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and
∆ηj ≡ (η1j − η0j, ..., ηrj − η0j, η1j − η2j, ..., η1j − ηrj, η2j − η3j, ..., η2j − ηrj, ..., ηr−1j − ηrj),
be the vectors of differences between every pairs of taste shocks for each side of the
market, with length d ≡
(
r+1
2
)
. Note that the first r components of ∆i and ∆ηj can be
arbitrary, while the remaining (d − r) components are linear combination of the first r
components. Hence, ∆i and ∆ηj take values in the region
B ≡ {(b1, b2, ..., bd) ∈ Rd : br+1 = b1 − b2, br+2 = b1 − b3, ..., b2r−1 = b1 − br,
b2r = b2 − b3, ..., b3r−3 = b2 − br, ...,
bd = br−1 − br}.
(8)
The definition of the sharp identified set for Φ follows naturally by exploiting Propo-
sition 1.
Definition 2. (Sharp identified set) Let Θ†, U †, and V† be the sets of admissible values
of Φ, U , and V , respectively.10 Let P†∆ and P†∆η be the function spaces of admissible
d-dimensional conditional probability distributions of the taste shock differences, P∆|X
and P∆η|Y , respectively, which can include parametric and/or nonparametric restrictions.
The sharp identified set for Φ is
Θ? ≡
{
Φ ∈ Θ† : ∃ U ∈ U †, V ∈ V†, P∆|X ∈ P†∆, P∆η|Y ∈ P†∆η s.t.
PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0
PQW |y(x) = ωW,x|y(V, P∆η|y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, Ux0 = Φx0, V0y = Φ0y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
P∆|x(B) = 1, P∆η|y(B) = 1 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
}
,
(9)
where ωM,y|x and ωW,x|y are known functions derived from (4) and (5).
Equivalently,
Θ? =
{
Φ ∈ Θ† : ∃ U ∈ U?, V ∈ V? s.t.
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, Ux0 = Φx0, V0y = Φ0y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
}
,
(10)
10U† and V† can incorporate scale and location normalisations to ensure that the volume of the sharp
identified set for Φ is not improperly inflated relative the the point identified case. See Section 4 for
more on this.
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where
U? ≡
{
U ∈ U † : ∃ P∆|X ∈ P†∆ s.t.
PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) and P∆|x(B) = 1 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0
}
,
and
V? ≡
{
V ∈ V† : ∃ P∆η|Y ∈ P†∆η s.t.
PQW |y(x) = ωW,x|y(V, P∆η|y) and P∆η|y(B) = 1 ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y
}
.

Definition 2 uses (4), (5), and (6) to define the sharp identified set for Φ. In partic-
ular, for a given {U, V, P∆|X , P∆η|Y }, the first and second equations of (9) impose that
the probability distributions {PQM |X , PQW |Y } coincide with the conditional match type
probabilities as derived from the maximisation problems, (4) and (5). The third equation
of (9) mimics (6). Finally, the fourth equation of (9) requires the conditional probability
distributions of the taste shock differences to be concentrated on the region B (hereafter
referred to as the degeneracy condition).11 Equivalently, we can consider identification
separately on each side of the market and then back out Φ using market-clearing transfer
conditions, as done in (10). One may think of many other ways to define Θ?. We have
provided two representations that are pedagogical for the procedure described below.12
To clarify Definition 2, Example 1 provides an explicit characterisation of Θ? when
r = 2 (d = 3).
Example 1. When r = 2 (d = 3), the vectors of taste shock differences, ∆i and ∆ηj,
are
∆i ≡ (i1 − i0, i2 − i0, i1 − i2),
∆ηj ≡ (η1j − η0j, η2j − η0j, η1j − η2j),
and the region B is given by
B ≡
{
(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b3 = b1 − b2)
}
.
Moreover, from (4), we can derive the probability that a man of type x ∈ X chooses
11Note that the degeneracy condition is trivially satisfied when r = 1.
12These two representations of the sharp identified set for Φ are derived under the assumption that the
two sides of the market are stochastically independent. In the absence of stochastic independence, the
definition of the sharp identified set for Φ will be based on the joint probability distribution of (∆i,∆ηj)
conditional on (Xi, Yj).
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a woman of type 1,
Pr(Ux1 + x1 ≥ Ux0 + x0, Ux1 + x1 ≥ Ux2 + x2|X = x)
=Pr(x1 − x0 ≥ Ux0 − Ux1, x1 − x2 ≥ Ux2 − Ux1|X = x)
=Pr(x1 − x0 ≥ Ux0 − Ux1, x2 − x0 ≥ −∞, x1 − x2 ≥ Ux2 − Ux1|X = x)
=P∆|x([Ux0 − Ux1,∞]× [−∞,∞]× [Ux2 − Ux1,∞]).
This last expression should be equal to the corresponding conditional match type prob-
ability observed in the data, that is PQM |x(1). The same steps can be repeated for each
conditional match type probabilities, using (4) and (5). Then, ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y , we have
that
PQM |x(1) = P∆|x([Ux0 − Ux1,∞]× [−∞,∞]× [Ux2 − Ux1,∞]),
PQM |x(2) = P∆|x([−∞,∞]× [Ux0 − Ux2,∞]× [−∞, Ux2 − Ux1]),
PQM |x(0) = P∆|x([−∞, Ux0 − Ux1]× [−∞, Ux0 − Ux2]× [−∞,∞]),
(11)
and
PQW |y(1) = P∆η|y([V0y − V1y,∞]× [−∞,∞]× [V2y − V1y,∞]),
PQW |y(2) = P∆η|y([−∞,∞]× [V0y − V2y,∞]× [−∞, V2y − V1y]),
PQW |y(0) = P∆η|y([−∞, V0y − V1y]× [−∞, V0y − V2y]× [−∞,∞]).
(12)
Therefore,
U? ≡
{
U ∈ U † : ∃ P∆|X ∈ P†∆ s.t. ∀x ∈ X (11) is satisfied and P∆|x(B) = 1
}
,
(13)
V? ≡
{
V ∈ V† : ∃ P∆η|Y ∈ P†∆η s.t. ∀y ∈ Y (12) is satisfied and P∆η|y(B) = 1
}
,
(14)
and Θ? is as in (10).

3.2 Constructing the sharp identified set
Performing the nonparametric exercise requires being able to construct Θ? without in-
corporating parametric restrictions into P†∆ and P†∆η. This involves two methodological
challenges on each side of the market. Specifically, on the men’s side, we first have
to find whether, for a given U ∈ U †, there exists P∆|X ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) =
ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) and P∆|x(B) = 1 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0. Without parametric restrictions
on the conditional probability distribution of the taste shocks, this corresponds to solv-
ing an infinite-dimensional existence problem because each P∆|X ∈ P†∆ is an infinite-
dimensional object. Second, such an infinite-dimensional existence problem has to be
solved for every U ∈ U †. Typically, this is done in the partial identification literature by
constructing a grid of points roughly resembling U † and then repeating the exercise of
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interest for each grid point. The difficulty of implementing that approach increases with
the size of the grid, which in turn, increases exponentially with the number of the agents’
types, hence quickly leading to a computational bottleneck. Similar issues are faced on
the women’s side.
In what follows we design a procedure that ameliorates the methodological challenges
just described. We organise the discussion in three steps, which are identical for each
side of the market. Without loss of generality, let us consider the men’s side. In the
first step, Section 3.2.1 establishes that, for a given U ∈ U †, determining whether there
exists P∆|X ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0 is equivalent
to finding whether a linear system has a solution, which is a well studied problem. This
result uses Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2018) (also known as PIES) under various classes of
nonparametric restrictions on the conditional probability distribution of the taste shock
differences.13
In the second step, Section 3.2.2 shows that U † can be ex-ante partitioned into a finite
number of convex subsets such that, for each subset, every value of U belonging to that
subset gives rise to the same linear programming problem of the first step. Therefore,
the researcher has to solve such a linear programming problem once for each subset.
Note that picking any one value of U from each subset amounts to solving another linear
programming problem because the subsets are convex.
In the third step, Section 3.2.3 discusses a way to approximate, for a given P∆|X ∈
P†∆, the degeneracy condition, P∆|x(B) = 1 ∀x ∈ X , by a system of linear equalities
which can be easily added to the linear programming problem of the first step.
Specular considerations can be made for the women’s side. We now explain the three
steps in detail by focusing on the men’s side.
3.2.1 A linear programming problem
As part of the construction of Θ?, the analyst has to find whether, for a given U ∈ U †,
there exists P∆|X ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0.
Without parametric restrictions on the conditional probability distribution of the taste
shocks, this corresponds to solving an infinite-dimensional existence problem because
each P∆|X ∈ P†∆ is an infinite-dimensional object. We exploit Theorem 1 in Torgov-
itsky (2018) to transform such an infinite-dimensional existence problem into a linear
programming problem.
Proposition 2. (Torgovitsky, 2018) Under various classes of nonparametric restrictions
possibly incorporated into P†∆, determining whether, for a given U ∈ U †, there exists
P∆|X ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0 is equivalent to
13A necessary condition to apply PIES is completeness in the sense of Tamer (2003), which our model
satisfies.
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finding whether a system of linear equalities and inequalities has at least one solution. 
We refer the reader to Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2018) for a notationally more precise
and detailed statement of the result together with its proof. Here we illustrate the main
intuition with an example. Consider the case r = 2 (d = 3) of Example 1. For each
P∆|X ∈ P†∆, let G∆|X ∈ G†∆ denote the corresponding conditional CDF, where G†∆ is the
function space of all admissible d-dimensional conditional CDFs. To keep things simple
suppose for the moment that the conditional probability distribution of the taste shock
differences is left completely unrestricted, i.e., P†∆ ≡ P (and, hence, G†∆ ≡ G), where
P is the function space of all possible d-dimensional conditional probability distributions
(and, similarly, G is the function space of all possible d-dimensional conditional CDFs).
We will discuss later how to incorporate nonparametric distributional assumptions on the
taste shock differences. From (13), we have the following infinite-dimensional existence
problem for a given U ∈ U †:
Find if there exists P∆|X ∈ P s.t. ∀x ∈ X
PQM |x(1) = P∆|x([Ux0 − Ux1,∞)× (−∞,∞)× [Ux2 − Ux1,∞)),
PQM |x(2) = P∆|x((−∞,∞)× [Ux0 − Ux2,∞)× (−∞, Ux2 − Ux1]),
PQM |x(0) = P∆|x((−∞, Ux0 − Ux1]× (−∞, Ux0 − Ux2]× (−∞,∞)).
(15)
Using G∆|X ∈ G, (15) can be equivalently written as,14
Find if there exists G∆|X ∈ G s.t. ∀x ∈ X
PQM |x(1) = 1 +G∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−G∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−G∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞),
PQM |x(2) = G∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−G∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1),
PQM |x(0) = G∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1, Ux0 − Ux2,∞).
(16)
The system of equations in (16) depends on the values of G∆|x at a finite number of
3-tuples, ∀x ∈ X . We thus introduce three finite sets
Ax,1(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux1,∞,−∞},
Ax,2(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux2,∞,−∞},
Ax,3(U) ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,∞,−∞},
∀x ∈ X , where Ax,1(U) collects the elements at which G∆|x is evaluated along the first
dimension, Ax,2(U) collects the elements at which G∆|x is evaluated along the second
14Recall that the volume of a cube can be written in terms of the CDF. Hence, ∀x ∈ X , we have that
P∆|x([a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× [a3, b3]) =
−G∆|x(a1, a2, a3) +G∆|x(b1, a2, a3) +G∆|x(a1, b2, a3)−G∆|x(b1, b2, a3)
+G∆|x(a1, a2, b3)−G∆|x(b1, a2, b3)−G∆|x(a1, b2, b3) +G∆|x(b1, b2, b3).
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dimension, and Ax,3(U) collects the elements at which G∆|x is evaluated along the third
dimension. We add −∞ to each set because the value of one-dimensional CDFs at −∞
is known and equal to 0 by definition. Lastly, we define Ax(U) ≡ Ax,1(U) × Ax,2(U) ×
Ax,3(U), where “×” denotes the Cartesian product operator. Therefore, (16) can be
equivalently written as
∀x ∈ X , find if there exists G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R s.t.
PQM |x(1) = 1 + G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞),
PQM |x(2) = G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1),
PQM |x(0) = G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1, Ux0 − Ux2,∞),
and G¯U∆|X can be extended to a conditional CDF in G.
(17)
(17) states that the existence problem (15) is equivalent to first finding whether a
system of linear equalities has a solution, and second ensuring that such a solution solves
an extension exercise. Note that the system has a finite number of equalities because
the domain of the function G¯U∆|X is finite. With regard to the extension exercise, using
fundamental results in copula theory, in particular Sklar’s Theorem, Torgovitsky (2018)
shows that verifying whether G¯U∆|X can be extended to a conditional CDF in G amounts
to checking if it satisfies the following system of linear equalities and inequalities ∀x ∈ X :
G¯U∆|x(−∞, t, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,2(U)×Ax,3(U),
G¯U∆|x(t,−∞, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1(U)×Ax,3(U),
G¯U∆|x(t, q,−∞) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1(U)×Ax,2(U),
G¯U∆|x(∞,∞,∞) = 1,
0 ≤ G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) ≤ 1 ∀(t, q, r) ∈ Ax(U),
[−G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r)+
G¯U∆|x(t, q, r
′)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r′) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r′)] ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax(U)
s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′).
(18)
Specifically, bearing in mind the properties defining CDFs, the first four lines in (18)
ensure that G¯U∆|x is equal to 0 when at least one of its arguments is −∞ and equal to 1
when all its arguments are ∞. The fifth line in (18) guarantees that the range of G¯U∆|x
is a subset of [0, 1]. The last line in (18) requires G¯U∆|x to be a 3-increasing function,
i.e., for each pair of 3-tuples in Ax(U) which are comparable, (t, q, r) and (t′, q′, r′), the
volume of the 3-dimensional box with vertices from {t, t′} × {q, q′} × {r, r′} is positive.15
By merging (17) and (18), an easy-to-solve linear programming problem is obtained.
15For a given x ∈ X , from Definition 1 in Torgovitsky (2018), G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R is d-increasing if
VolG¯U∆|x(u
′, u′′) ≡
∑
u∈Vrt(u′,u′′)
sgn(u′,u′′)(u)G¯U∆|x(u) ≥ 0 ∀u′, u′′ ∈ Ax(U) s.t. u′ ≤ u′′,
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The procedure described allows to incorporate into P†∆ many classes of nonparametric
restrictions. This is useful in partial identification analysis to see how the bounds on Φ
shrink under more or less stringent assumptions. Indeed, Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky
(2018) shows that such constraints are simply added to (18) as linear equalities and
inequalities. For example, one can impose that the conditional probability distribution
of the taste shock differences is characterised by identical marginals, i.e., P k∆|X = P k
′
∆|X
∀{k, k′} ⊆ {1, ..., d}, where P k∆|X denotes the kth marginal of P∆|X . We can include that
the marginals are symmetric about zero, i.e., P k∆|X((−∞, a]) = 1 − P k∆|X((−∞,−a])
∀a ∈ R and ∀k ∈ {1, ..., d}. Joint or marginal independence of the agents’ types can
be imposed by using P∆|x = P∆|x′ or P k∆|x = P k
′
∆|x′ ∀{x, x′} ⊆ X and ∀k ∈ {1, ..., d},
respectively. Further, any quantile of P∆|X or {P k∆|X}k∈{1,...,d} can be set equal to known
values. We refer the reader to Assumption A in Torgovitsky (2018) for an accurate
taxonomy of the nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shock differences
that can be accommodated.
To give an idea of how the linear programming problem should be modified when
nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shock differences are included,
consider imposing that the conditional marginal probability distributions of the taste
shock differences are symmetric about zero. Then, we have
Ax,1(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux1,−Ux0 + Ux1,∞,−∞},
Ax,2(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux2,−Ux0 + Ux2,∞,−∞},
Ax,3(U) ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,−Ux2 + Ux1,∞,−∞},
where Vrt(u′, u′′) ≡ {u ∈ Ax(U): ul ∈ {u′l, u′′l } ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}} and
sgn(u′,u′′)(u) ≡
{
1 if ul = u′l for an even number of l ∈ {1, ..., d}
−1 if ul = u′l for an odd number of l ∈ {1, ..., d}
.
VolG¯U∆|x(u
′, u′′) is the volume of the d-dimensional box [u′1, u′′1 ]× [u′2, u′′2 ]× ...× [u′L, u′′L] and Vrt(u′, u′′)
is the collection of the vertices of this box. Note that d-increasing reduces to the standard definition of
weakly increasing when r = 1.
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∀x ∈ X .16 The linear programming problem to solve becomes
∀x ∈ X , find if there exists G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R s.t.
PQM |x(1) = 1 + G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞),
PQM |x(2) = G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1),
PQM |x(0) = G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1, Ux0 − Ux2,∞),
(18) is satisfied,
G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(−Ux0 + Ux1,∞,∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,−Ux0 + Ux2,−∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞,−Ux2 + Ux1).
(19)
Note that the first three equations above are identical to (16), (18) refers to the extension
exercise, and the last three equations impose symmetry of the marginals about zero.
Before concluding, we remark that the methodology illustrated does not allow to
incorporate nonparametric assumptions on the conditional probability distributions of
the original taste shocks, that is on P|X and Pη|Y . Given that in multinomial choice
models what matters are differences in utilities (and not absolute levels), this is the
obvious price to pay for having a flexible nonparametric approach that permits us to
compare the empirical content of the model under different scenarios.
3.2.2 Partitioning the parameter space, U †
As part of the construction of Θ?, the analyst has to solve the linear programming prob-
lem described in Section 3.2.1 for every U ∈ U †. Typically, this is done in the partial
identification literature by constructing a grid of points approximating U † and then re-
peating the exercise of interest for each grid point. The difficulty of implementing such an
approach increases with the size of the grid, which in turn, increases exponentially with
the number of the agents’ types, hence quickly leading to a computational bottleneck.
In what follows we give a characterisation of U † so that the issue of solving the linear
programming problem for every U ∈ U † is reduced to solving it for a handful of U ∈ U †.17
Proposition 3. (Partitioning U †) Let P†∆ include any nonparametric restrictions on the
conditional probability distribution of the taste shock differences considered in Proposi-
tion 2. Then, for every x ∈ X , U † can be ex-ante partitioned into a finite number, Kx,
16Note that every time we add restrictions to the linear programming problem the set Ax(U) can
potentially change.
17Recall that, for a given U ∈ U†, solving the linear programming problem described in Section 3.2.1
amounts to establishing if there exists P∆|X ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U,P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×
Y0. Solving this linear programming problem does not mean recovering the full collection of P∆|X ∈ P†∆
such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U,P∆|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0, which would be an intractable exercise.
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of convex subsets, U †1,x, ...,U †Kx,x, such that ∀k ∈ {1, ..., Kx} and ∀{U, U˜} ⊆ U †k,x,
∃ P∆|x ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U, P∆|x) ∀y ∈ Y0
if and only if
∃ P∆|x ∈ P†∆ such that PQM |x(y) = ωM,y|x(U˜ , P∆|x) ∀y ∈ Y0.

As a consequence of Proposition 3, given k ∈ {1, ..., Kx} and x ∈ X , the analyst
has to pick any one value of U from the partitioning subset U †k,x, and solve the linear
programming problem of Section 3.2.1 at that value. This should be done for every
k ∈ {1, ..., Kx} and x ∈ X in order to span the entire parameter space, U †. Hence, the
linear programming problem of Section 3.2.1 is solved only ∑x∈X Kx times.
We now sketch the intuition behind Proposition 3 continuing from the linear program-
ming problem (19), which refers to the case with r = 2 (d = 3). Given x ∈ X , the only
piece of (19) that can potentially induce different solutions for different values of U is
the one requiring the function G¯U∆|x : Ax(U) → R to be 3-increasing. That is, for each
pair of 3-tuples in Ax(U) which are comparable, (t, q, r) and (t′, q′, r′), the volume of the
3-dimensional box with vertices from {t, t′} × {q, q′} × {r, r′} is positive:
− G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r)
+ G¯U∆|x(t, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r′) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r′) ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax(U) s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′).
(20)
(20) can induce different solutions for different values of U because different values of
U can generate different pairs of comparable 3-tuples in Ax(U). This implies that the
3-dimensional boxes for which we have to ensure a positive volume may have vertices
located at different positions (in other words, “differently ordered”) in Rd for different
values of U . Such observation immediately suggests that if two values of U generate pairs
of 3-tuples in Ax(U) that are “similarly ordered” in Rd (as formalised in the proof in
Appendix A), then they should lead to the same constraints on G¯U∆|x’s image set of the
type (20). In turn, they will have the same solution to (19) at x ∈ X .
For every x ∈ X , an important property of the partitioning subsets, U †1,x, ...,U †Kx,x,
is convexity. This follows from the fact that the elements of the set Ax,j(U) are linear
functionals of the elements of the vector U , for each j ∈ {1, ..., d}. Therefore, ordering
the elements of the set Ax,j(U) preserves linearity, for each j ∈ {1, ..., d}. The convexity
of the partitioning subsets enables us to formulate the problem of picking a value of U
from U †k,x as a linear programming problem, for every k ∈ {1, ..., Kx}.
Lastly, note that for every x ∈ X the number of partitioning subsets, Kx, is finite.
Providing a general formula to compute Kx that is valid under any class of nonparametric
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distributional assumptions on the taste shock differences contemplated by Proposition 2
does not seem to be viable. Nevertheless, we can certainly say that Kx increases with
the cardinality of Y (the higher is the cardinality of Y , the higher is d) and with the
number of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shock differences (a
greater number of assumptions may imply higher cardinalities of Ax(U)).
3.2.3 The degeneracy condition
Recall that the conditional probability distribution of the vector of the original (i.e., not
differenced) taste shocks, i, is denoted by P|X . When we consider the vector of taste
shock differences, ∆i, its conditional probability distribution, P∆|X , depends on P|X .
Specifically, P∆|X has to be concentrated on the region B defined by (8). Hence, as part
of the construction of Θ? the researcher should ensure that the conditional probability
distribution, P∆|X , solving the linear programming problem of Section 3.2.1 satisfies the
degeneracy condition, P∆|X(B) = 1. Without incorporating the degeneracy condition
one does not exploit all the information coming from the model and thus obtains an
outer set of Θ?.
In what follows we propose a computationally tractable approximation of the degen-
eracy condition. Specifically, we suggest to approximate the degeneracy condition by a
finite collection of equalities that are linear in the CDF G∆|X and therefore, linear in
the function G¯U∆|X introduced in (17). Hence, these equalities can be easily added to the
linear programming problem of Section 3.2.1
More formally, let us first state Proposition 4 which provides an equivalent charac-
terisation of the degeneracy condition in terms of zero probability measure conditions on
boxes in Qd, where Q ⊂ R is the set of rational numbers.
Proposition 4. (Degeneracy condition) For any (bˆ, b˜) ∈ R2, consider the d-dimensional
boxes in Rd
Bt,p,q(bˆ, b˜) ≡ {(z1, ..., zd) ∈ Rd: zt > bˆ+ b˜, zp ≤ bˆ, zq ≤ b˜},
and
Qt,p,q(bˆ, b˜) ≡ {(z1, ..., zd) ∈ Rd: zt ≤ bˆ+ b˜, zp > bˆ, zq > b˜},
∀t ∈ {1, ..., r − 1} and ∀(p, q) ∈ {(t+ 1, r + 1), (t+ 2, r + 2), ..., (r, d)}.
For each P∆|X ∈ P†∆,
P∆|X(Bt,p,q(bˆ, b˜)) = P∆|X(Qt,p,q(bˆ, b˜)) = 0
∀t ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}, ∀(p, q) ∈ {(t+ 1, r + 1), (t+ 2, r + 2), ..., (r, d)},∀(b, b˜) ∈ Q2
(21)
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if and only if
P∆|X(B) = 1.

The idea underlying Proposition 4 is that, for a given P∆|X ∈ P†∆, if P∆|X(B) = 1,
then any d-dimensional box in Rd not intersecting the region B has probability measure
zero. Conversely, it is sufficient to impose such a zero probability measure condition for
all the d-dimensional boxes in Qd not intersecting the region B to satisfy P∆|X(B) = 1.
Proposition 4 suggests that by imposing (21) at a finite grid of 2-tuples from Q2 we
can approximate the degeneracy condition. The finer is the grid, the better is the approx-
imation. Furthermore, (21) is linear in the CDF G∆|X and hence, can be incorporated in
the linear programming problem of Section 3.2.1 for every U ∈ U † after having replaced
G∆|X with G¯U∆|X .
To clarify how the linear programming problem of Section 3.2.1 should be modified,
consider assuming that the conditional marginal probability distributions of the taste
shock differences are symmetric about zero. For simplicity, select two 2-tuples from Q2,
(bˆ1, b˜1), (bˆ2, b˜2), to approximate the degeneracy condition. Observe that
P∆|X(B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = G∆|X(∞, bˆ, b˜)−G∆|X(bˆ+ b˜, bˆ, b˜)
P∆|X(Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = G∆|X(bˆ+ b˜,∞,∞)−G∆|X(bˆ+ b˜, bˆ,∞)−G∆|X(bˆ+ b˜,∞, b˜) +G∆|X(bˆ+ b˜, bˆ, b˜)
for any (bˆ, b˜) ∈ Q2. Then, given U ∈ U †, we have
Ax,1(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux1,−Ux0 + Ux1, bˆ1 + b˜1,−bˆ1 − b˜1, bˆ2 + b˜2,−bˆ2 − b˜2,∞,−∞},
Ax,2(U) ≡ {Ux0 − Ux2,−Ux0 + Ux2, bˆ1,−bˆ1, bˆ2,−bˆ2,∞,−∞},
Ax,3(U) ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,−Ux2 + Ux1, b˜1,−b˜1, b˜2,−b˜2∞,−∞},
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for every x ∈ X . The linear programming problem to solve becomes
∀x ∈ X , find if there exists G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R s.t.
PQM |x(1) = 1 + G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞),
PQM |x(2) = G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1),
PQM |x(0) = G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1, Ux0 − Ux2,∞),
(18) is satisfied,
G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(−Ux0 + Ux1,∞,∞),
G¯U∆|x(bˆ1 + b˜1,∞,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(−bˆ1 − b˜1,∞,∞),
G¯U∆|x(bˆ2 + b˜2,∞,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(−bˆ2 − b˜2,∞,∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,−Ux0 + Ux2,−∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞, bˆ1,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,−bˆ1,−∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞, bˆ2,∞) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,−bˆ2,−∞),
G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux1 − Ux2) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞,−Ux1 + Ux2),
G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, b˜1) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞,−b˜1),
G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, b˜2) = 1− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞,−b˜2),
G¯U∆|X(∞, bˆ1, b˜1)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ1 + b˜1, bˆ1, b˜1) = 0,
G¯U∆|X(bˆ1 + b˜1,∞,∞)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ1 + b˜1, bˆ1,∞)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ1 + b˜1,∞, b˜1) + G¯U∆|X(bˆ1 + b˜1, bˆ1, b˜1) = 0,
G¯U∆|X(∞, bˆ2, b˜2)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ2 + b˜2, bˆ2, b˜2) = 0,
G¯U∆|X(bˆ2 + b˜2,∞,∞)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ2 + b˜2, bˆ2,∞)− G¯U∆|X(bˆ2 + b˜2,∞, b˜2) + G¯U∆|X(bˆ2 + b˜2, bˆ2, b˜2) = 0,
where the last four equations impose that the approximated complement of B has prob-
ability measure zero.
4 Monte Carlo simulations
This section investigates via simulations how the shape of the sharp identified set for
Φ, Θ?, varies under different data generating processes. More precisely, we construct Θ?
when r = 2 (d = 3) as in Example 1 under two data generating processes. According to
the first data generating process (hereafter, DGP1), the taste shocks on each side of the
market are distributed independently of the agents’ types as i.i.d. Gumbel with scale 1
and location 0, as in Choo and Siow (2006). Additionally, PX(1) = PY (1) = 12 . According
to the second data generating process (hereafter, DGP2), the 3-dimensional vectors of
taste shocks on each side of the market are distributed independently of the agents’ types
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as equiprobable Gaussian mixtures of 4 components,
N
(−1−1
−1
 ,
8.7 2.1 2.12.1 8.7 2.1
2.1 2.1 8.7
),N(
3.53.5
3.5
 ,
 1 0.9 0.90.9 1 0.9
0.9 0.9 1
),
N
(−2−2
−2
 ,
 4.5 −1.3 −1.3−1.3 4.5 −1.3
−1.3 −1.3 4.5
),N(
4.64.6
4.6
 ,
 1 −0.4 −0.4−0.4 1 −0.4
1 1 −0.4
).
Moreover, PX(1) = 16 and PY (1) =
1
5 . In both data generating processes, Φ11 = Φ22 = 3
and Φ12 = Φ21 = 2, i.e., the systematic component of the match surplus is higher when
the two partners are of the same type. Lastly, Φ0y = Φx0 = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y .
In order to construct Θ? we include scale and location normalisations into the pa-
rameter spaces, U † and V†. Such normalisations ensure that the volume of Θ? is not
improperly inflated relative to the point identified case. We impose different normali-
sations depending on whether the function spaces of admissible conditional probability
distributions for the taste shock differences, P†∆ and P†∆η, incorporate or not indepen-
dence between the taste shock differences and the agents’ types. Specifically, when P†∆
and P†∆η do not incorporate independence, we define
U † ≡
{
(Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0) ∈ R6:
[location normalisation] Ux0 = 0 ∀x ∈ X
[scale normalisation] Ux1 ∈ {−1, 1} ∀x ∈ X
}
,
(22)
V† ≡
{
(Vxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y) ∈ R6:
[location normalisation] V0y = 0 ∀y ∈ Y
[scale normalisation] V1y ∈ {−1, 1} ∀y ∈ Y
}
,
(23)
where the first condition exactly mimics Choo and Siow (2006) as a location normalisa-
tion, and the second condition is a scale normalisation.18 Instead, when P†∆ and P†∆η
18In other words, we consider vectors like(U10 − U10
|U11| ,
U11 − U10
|U11| ,
U12 − U10
|U11| ,
U20 − U20
|U21| ,
U21 − U20
|U21| ,
U22 − U20
|U21|
)
,(V01 − V01
|V11| ,
V11 − V01
|V11| ,
V21 − V01
|V11| ,
V02 − V02
|V12| ,
V12 − V02
|V12| ,
V22 − V02
|V12|
)
.
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incorporate independence, we define
U † ≡
{
(Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0) ∈ R6:
[location normalisation] Ux0 = 0 ∀x ∈ X
[scale normalisation] U11 ∈ {−1, 1}
}
,
(24)
V† ≡
{
(Vxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y) ∈ R6:
[location normalisation] V0y = 0 ∀y ∈ Y
[scale normalisation] V11 ∈ {−1, 1}
}
.
(25)
Note that when P†∆ and P†∆η do not incorporate independence we impose more scale
normalisations than in the independence case. In particular, when P†∆ and P†∆η do not
incorporate independence, we impose one scale normalisation for each x ∈ X on the men’s
side and one scale normalisation for each y ∈ Y on the women’s side. This is because
determining whether U belongs to U? requires recovering |X | admissible conditional prob-
ability distributions, {P∆|x ∀x ∈ X}. Similarly, determining whether V belongs to V?
requires recovering |Y| admissible conditional probability distributions, {P∆η|y ∀y ∈ Y}.
In fact, if U and V belong to U? and V? for some {P∆|x ∀x ∈ X} and {P∆η|y ∀y ∈ Y},
then any rescaled version of {P∆|x ∀x ∈ X} and {P∆η|y ∀y ∈ Y} induces some scalar
multiples of U and V to also belong to U? and V?, respectively. Hence, the number of
scale normalisations to impose on U † and V† is equal to the number of conditional prob-
ability distributions to recover, that is |X |+ |Y|. Instead, when P†∆ and P†∆η incorporate
independence, we impose just one scale normalisation on the men’s side and one scale
normalisation on the women’s side. This is because determining whether U belongs to U?
requires recovering only one admissible conditional probability distribution, P∆, where
P∆ ≡ P∆|x ∀x ∈ X . Similarly, determining whether V belongs to V? requires recovering
only one admissible conditional probability distribution, P∆η, where P∆η ≡ P∆η|y ∀y ∈ Y .
Finally, note that the scale and location normalisations just discussed are imposed
on the vectors U and V which are equilibrium objects (and, hence, they can vary with
PX , PY , P|X , Pη|Y even if Φ remains the same), and not primitive parameters. Conse-
quently, the shapes of the normalised sharp identified sets based on DGP1 and DGP2
are not directly comparable.
The figures below report Θ? under various classes of nonparametric distributional
assumptions on the taste shock differences. Each figure is composed of six sub-figures
where we project Θ? along every two of its dimensions. All the linear programming
problems have been solved by calling Gurobi in Matlab.
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are based on DGP1. The black regions represent the
projections of Θ?. The red dots represent the projections of the normalised true value
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of Φ. Figure 1 reports the projections of Θ? when no restriction on the conditional
probability distributions of the latent variables is imposed, i.e., P†∆ = P†∆η = P . As
expected, the black regions are completely uninformative, i.e., for any value of Φ one
can find some P∆|X ∈ P and P∆η|Y ∈ P that can reproduce the equilibrium conditional
match type probabilities, PY |X and PX|Y . Note that the vertical black lines appearing in
some sub-figures are due to the scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23).
We continue the analysis by incorporating into P†∆ and P†∆η increasingly restrictive
nonparametric distributional restrictions to see how the empirical content of the model
varies under different scenarios. Figure 2 reports the projections of Θ? when the analyst
assumes that the conditional probability distributions of the taste shock differences have
marginals symmetric about zero. Such a restriction allows to reject significant portions of
the parameter space and to identify the signs of Φ22 and Φ11. Further, imposing that the
conditional probability distributions of the taste shock differences are characterised by
identical marginals (Figure 3) does not seem to induce noticeable improvements. Figure
4 reports the projections of Θ? when the analyst assumes that the taste shock differences
are independent of the agents’ types and that their marginal probability distributions
are symmetric about zero and identical.19 As before, these restrictions are sufficient to
identify the signs of Φ22 and Φ11.
Figure 5 adds to the scenario of Figure 3 the assumption that the 2-dimensional
vectors of taste shock differences which are relevant for each type choice20 are identically
distributed conditional on the agents’ types. This enables us to identify the sign of all
the components of Φ. Moreover, the bounds on Φ12 and Φ21 are very tight. Further,
imposing that the taste shock differences are independent of the agents’ types (Figure
6) permits us to identify the sign of all the components of Φ and to obtain a narrow
projection for Φ12.21 This last case is as close as one can get to the framework of Choo
and Siow (2006) without assuming mutually independent and Gumbel distributed taste
shocks. Hence, the sizes of the black regions can be interpreted as the cost of removing
those restrictions on the latent variables.22
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 are based on DGP2. The figures do not include the projections
of the normalised true value of Φ (red dots) because their calculations are very complicated
19 Note that the black regions in Figure 4 are not expected to be tighter than those in Figure 3. This
is because, as explained earlier, we impose less scale normalisations into U† and V† when P†∆ and P†∆η
incorporate independence between the taste shock differences and the agents’ types.
20Remember that, as highlighted by Example 1, when man i ∈ I of type x ∈ X decides whether to
choose a woman of type y ∈ Y0, he compares Uxy + iy with Ux0 + i0 and Uxy˜ + iy˜ for y˜ 6= y. Hence,
the vector of taste shock differences that are relevant for such a type choice is (iy − i0, iy − iy˜) with
size 2× 1. Similar considerations can be made for the women’s side.
21Note that the black regions in Figure 6 are not expected to be tighter than those in Figure 5. See
footnote 19 for an explanation.
22It is worthwhile to point out here that it is not possible to test the Gumbel assumption or any other
probability distribution of the taste shocks. This is because Galichon and Salanié (2015) prove that if
P|X and Pη|Y are fully known, then there always exists one (and only one) value of Φ that can reproduce
the empirical conditional match types probabilities.
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under DGP2.23 The black regions look overall less informative than under DGP1. For
example, under all the scenarios considered, we obtain unbounded intervals for every
component of Φ. This suggests that, when the underlying data generating process is
characterised by very correlated taste shocks, a substantial part of the empirical content
of the model is determined by the assumed parametric specification of the conditional
probability distribution of the latent variables together with the numerical values assigned
to its parameters.
23The formulas are provided by Proposition 2 in Galichon and Salanié (2015) based on the Envelope
Theorem.
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Figure 1: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when no restriction on the conditional probability
distributions of the taste shocks are incorporated. The red dots represent the projections
of the true value of Φ. The location and scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23)
are imposed.
Figure 2: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that the conditional
probability distributions of the taste shock differences have marginals symmetric about
zero. The red dots represent the projections of the true value of Φ. The location and
scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23) are imposed.
27
Figure 3: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that the conditional
probability distributions of the taste shock differences have marginals symmetric about
zero and identical. The red dots represent the projections of the true value of Φ. The
location and scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23) are imposed. Imposing in
addition to the scenario of Figure 2 that the conditional probability distributions of
the taste shock differences are characterised by identical marginals does not noticeably
improve the identifying power of the model.
Figure 4: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that the taste shock
differences are independent of the agents’ types with marginal probability distributions
identical and symmetric about zero. The red dots represent the projections of the true
value of Φ. The location and scale normalisations discussed in (24) and (25) are imposed.
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Figure 5: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that (i) the conditional
probability distributions of the taste shock differences have marginals identical and sym-
metric about zero, and (ii) the 2-dimensional vectors of taste shock differences which are
relevant for each type choice are identically distributed conditional on the agents’ types.
The red dots represent the projections of the true value of Φ. The location and scale
normalisations discussed in (22) and (23) are imposed.
Figure 6: The figure is based on DGP1. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that (i) the taste shock
differences are independent of the agents’ types with marginal probability distributions
identical and symmetric about zero, and (ii) the 2-dimensional vectors of taste shock
differences which are relevant for each type choice are identically distributed. The red
dots represent the projections of the true value of Φ. The location and scale normalisations
discussed in (24) and (25) are imposed. This is as close as one can get to the framework of
Choo and Siow (2006) without assuming mutually independent and Gumbel distributed
taste shocks.
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Figure 7: The figure is based on DGP2. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that the conditional
probability distributions of the taste shock differences have marginals symmetric about
zero. The location and scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23) are imposed.
Figure 8: The figure is based on DGP2. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that the taste shock
differences are independent of the agents’ types with marginal probability distributions
identical and symmetric about zero. The location and scale normalisations discussed in
(24) and (25) are imposed.
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Figure 9: The figure is based on DGP2. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that (i) the conditional
probability distributions of the taste shock differences have marginals identical and sym-
metric about zero, and (ii) the 2-dimensional vectors of taste shock differences which are
relevant for each type choice are identically distributed conditional on the agents’ types.
The location and scale normalisations discussed in (22) and (23) are imposed.
Figure 10: The figure is based on DGP2. The black regions represent the projections of
Θ? along every two of its dimensions when the researcher assumes that (i) the taste shock
differences are independent of the agents’ types with marginal probability distributions
identical and symmetric about zero, and (ii) the 2-dimensional vectors of taste shock
differences which are relevant for each type choice are identically distributed. The location
and scale normalisations discussed in (24) and (25) are imposed.
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5 Inference
Section 3 studies identification of the vector of type-specific match surpluses, Φ, by relying
on the assumption that the probability distributions {PQM |X , PQW |Y , PX , PY } are known
by the analyst. However, when doing an empirical analysis, the analyst should replace
these probability distributions with their sample analogues as resulting from having i.i.d.
observations {QM,i, Xi, QW,j, Yj}i∈{1,...,n},j∈{1,...,n}.24 In what follows we illustrate how to
construct a (1− α) confidence region for each Φ ∈ Θ?, with α ∈ (0, 1).
We reformulate the characterization of Θ? in terms of unconditional moment equalities
and then apply results from the recent literature on inference in unconditional moment
(in)equality models. In particular, we suggest to use a computationally tractable version
of the profiled subsampling technique illustrated by Politis and Romano (1994), Romano
and Shaikh (2008; 2012).
To keep the exposition readable, we continue the discussion by focusing on the case
r = 2 (d = 3) of Example 1. Given U ∈ U † and V ∈ V†, consider the linear equalities in
(17) for each side of the market
PQM |x(1) = 1 + G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1,∞,∞),
PQM |x(2) = G¯U∆|x(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)− G¯U∆|x(∞, Ux0 − Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1),
PQM |x(0) = G¯U∆|x(Ux0 − Ux1, Ux0 − Ux2,∞),
PQW |y(1) = 1 + G¯V∆η|y(V0y − V1y,∞, V2y − V1y)− G¯V∆η|x(∞,∞, V2y − V1y)− G¯V∆η|x(V0y − V1y,∞,∞),
PQW |y(2) = G¯V∆η|y(∞,∞, V2y − V1y)− G¯V∆η|x(∞, V0y − V2y, V2y − V1y),
PQW |y(0) = G¯V∆η|y(V0y − V1y, V0y − V2y,∞),
∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
(26)
where the functions G¯U∆|x : Ax(U) → R and G¯V∆η|y : Ay(V ) → R are constructed, as
explained earlier, according to the nonparametric distributional assumptions of interest
(Section 3.2.1) and the approximated degeneracy condition (Section 3.2.3).
Let ω¯M,y|x(G¯U∆|x) denote the right hand side of the equation for PQM |x(y) in (26),
∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0. Let ω¯W,x|y(G¯V∆η|y) denote the right hand side of the equation for
PQW |y(x) in (26), ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y . Define
mM,i,x,y(G¯U∆|x) ≡ 1{QM,i = y,Xi = x} − ω¯M,y|x(G¯U∆|x)1{Xi = x},
mW,j,x,y(G¯V∆η|y) ≡ 1{QW,j = x, Yj = y} − ω¯W,x|y(G¯V∆η|y)1{Yj = y}.
24For simplicity of notation, we assume that the analyst has the same number of observations, n, from
each side of the market.
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Hence, (26) is equivalent to the system of unconditional moment equalities
E(mM,i,x,y(G¯U∆|x)) = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
E(mW,j,x,y(G¯V∆η|y)) = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y .
(27)
Using the unconditional moment equalities in (27), we now describe a test at level
α ∈ (0, 1) based on Romano and Shaikh (2008) for the null hypothesis H0 : Φ = Φ0.
Then, a (1 − α) confidence region for each Φ ∈ Θ? can be constructed by inverting the
test, i.e., by collecting all the values Φ0 for which the test does not reject at level α.
Given (x, y) ∈ X × Y , let SU,V,x,y be the collection of pairs of functions G¯U∆|x :
Ax(U) → R and G¯V∆η|y : Ay(V ) → R which satisfy the constraints guaranteeing that
G¯U∆|x is extendable to a conditional CDF in G†∆|x, G¯V∆η|y is extendable to a conditional
CDF in G†∆η|y, and such conditional CDFs are concentrated on the region B, as discussed
in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. We propose the following test statistic.
TSn(Φ0) ≡ inf
U, V
{G¯U∆|x}∀x∈X
{G¯V∆η|y}∀y∈Y
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y0
(√
n mˆM,n,x,y(G¯U∆|x)
)2
+
∑
(x,y)∈X0×Y
(√
n mˆW,n,x,y(G¯V∆η|y)
)2
s.t. U ∈ U†, V ∈ V†,
{G¯U∆|x, G¯V∆η|y} ∈ SU,V,x,y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
U + V = Φ0,
(28)
where mˆM,n,x,y(G¯U∆|x) and mˆW,n,x,y(G¯V∆η|y) are the empirical counterparts of the moments
E(mM,i,x,y(G¯U∆|x)) and E(mW,j,x,y(G¯V∆η|y)), respectively. We show in Appendix B that
(28) can be equivalently rewritten as a mixed integer quadratic programming, which can
be solved in Gurobi by using pre-built packages.25 The quadratic feature is because
mˆM,n,x,y(G¯U∆|x) and mˆW,n,x,y(G¯V∆η|y) are linear functions of G¯U∆|x and G¯V∆η|y,26 and, thus,
the objective function is quadratic. The mixed integer feature is because the constraints
in SU,V,x,y requiring G¯U∆|x and G¯V∆η|y to be 3-increasing functions are relevant only for
comparable 3-tuples in Ax(U) and Ay(V ), and therefore, they are nonlinear in U and
V .27 Such nonlinear constraints can be incorporated into the problem by using auxiliary
25For the validity of the procedure, it is important that the Gurobi solver finds the global minimum in
(28) and does not get stuck in a local minimum. We reduce this risk by choosing a very small tolerance
level, among the tuning parameters of the solver.
26To preserve this linearity we have decided not to rescale the moment equalities by their standard
deviations. The cost is losing the scale invariance property of the test statistic. Some of the earlier
papers on inference for partially identified parameters, such as Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007),
Romano and Shaikh (2008), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), consider modified methods of moments
estimators that are not scale invariant. Andrews and Soares (2010) discuss that this may lead to poor
power performances.
27Recall that the programming discussed in Section 3.2.1 is linear in G¯U∆|x and G¯V∆η|y and not in U
and V .
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binary variables via the big-M modelling approach (e.g., Williams, 2013).
In order to obtain a critical value, we draw without replacement Bn subsamples of size
bn from the original sample28 and compute TSbn,k(Φ0), which is the test statistic defined
in (28) using the k-th subsample, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., Bn}. Hence, the critical value cˆn,1−α(Φ0)
corresponds to the (1− α) quantile of the subsampling distribution
Ln(t,Φ0) ≡ 1
Bn
Bn∑
k=1
1{TSbn,k(Φ0) ≤ t}.
The test rejects if TSn(Φ0) > cˆn,1−α(Φ0). In turn, the (1− α) confidence region for each
Φ ∈ Θ? is
Cn,1−α ≡ {Φ ∈ Θ†: TSn(Φ) ≤ cˆn,1−α(Φ)}. (29)
6 Empirical illustration
The methodology developed can be used to empirically examine if the variations in match-
ing patterns over time are caused by changes in the marginal probability distributions
of the agents’ types, or by changes in the agents’ preferences for assortativeness in a
sense that we define precisely below. In what follows we address this issue within an
application in household economics. In particular, we investigate the evolution of the
marriage market in the U.S. by education. The application framework and the data are
taken from Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) (hereafter, CSW). We distinguish from
CSW in that we proceed without relying on parametric distributional assumptions for
the latent variables, and thus we get conclusions that are possibly more robust.
The data are extracted by CSW from the American Community Survey, that is a
representative part of the census. For shortness of exposition, we look at whites only,
and not at whites and blacks in two distinct studies as done by CSW. We consider
individuals born between 1940 and 1968. Using the definition of marriage adopted by
CSW, we obtain a sample of 1, 502, 157 couples and 542, 677 singles. We observe the latest
school degree of each individual in the sample. To simplify the analysis, we regroup the
five education categories specified by CSW into two levels, that are “Four-year college
graduates or graduate degrees” (hereafter, CD) and “High school dropouts, high school
graduates, or some college” (hereafter, NCD). We refer the reader to section 1.A in CSW
for a more accurate description of the data.
By extending on Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009), CSW combine a collective
household model with a matching framework to formally explain the gender-asymmetric
changes in the demand for higher education observed after 1950 in the U.S. Among
the various results, CSW show that the matching assignment is positively assortative
28As highlighted in Romano and Shaikh (2008), Bn and bn should be set such that limn→∞Bn =∞
and limn→∞ bnn = 0.
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on education, i.e., individuals prefer to pair up with partners of the same education
category, in line with Becker (1973). They further prove that the agents’ preferences for
assortativeness, i.e., the extra-surplus generated when individuals pair up with partners
of the same education category, has increased over time.
Providing an empirical confirmation of these theoretical findings is challenging. For
example, with respect to the predicted change in the agents’ preferences for assortative-
ness over time, the proportion of couples in the U.S. in which both partners have a college
degree has certainly increased in recent decades (Figure 11).
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Figure 11: Proportion of couples in the U.S. in which both partners have a college degree.
However, when examining the sources of this trend, the researcher should disentangle
the part that is potentially due to an increase in the returns from homogamy (i.e., a
change in Φ), as conjectured by CSW’s model, from the part that is mechanically due to
an increase in the proportion of educated women (i.e., a change in PY ), as depicted in
Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Proportion of individuals with and without a college degree by gender.
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In the second part of the paper, CSW address such a question by using the matching
framework of Section 2, under the assumption that the taste shocks on each side of the
market are distributed independently of the agents’ types as i.i.d. Gumbel with scale
1 and location 0. We want to investigate the same issue without relying on parametric
distributional assumptions for the latent variables, but just on nonparametric restrictions.
Let X = Y ≡ {1, 2} (hence, r = 2 and d = 3 as in Example 1), where “2” denotes
education category CD and “1” denotes education category NCD. As per CSW, the
agents’ preferences for assortativeness are measured by the supermodular core of Φ,
D(Φ) ≡ Φ22 + Φ11 − Φ12 − Φ21.
If D(Φ) ≥ 0 (D(Φ) < 0), then the matching process shows a tendency towards pos-
itive (negative) assortativeness, because agents in the same education category act as
complements (substitutes) and produce a higher (lower) surplus when pairing up.
In order to test whether there have been changes in the agents’ preferences for assor-
tativeness over time, one has to define and separate “matching markets”. As per CSW,
matching market t involves the men whose year of birth is t and the women whose year
of birth is t + 1, for a total of 28 matching markets. While CSW compare every two
subsequent matching markets, here for an illustration of our method we focus on the
matching market 1940 (hereafter, matching market t1) and the matching market 1967
(hereafter, matching market t2).
We assume that a match process featuring the characteristics described in Section
2 takes place in markets t1 and t2 with primitives denoted by {Φt1 , P t1X , P t1Y , P t1|X , P t1η|Y }
and {Φt2 , P t2X , P t2Y , P t2|X , P t2η|Y }, respectively. To determine whether the changes in the
matching patterns are due to changes in the marginal probability distributions of the
agents’ types or changes in the surplus parameters, we abstract from variations in the
conditional probability distributions of the latent variables. In particular, we impose that
P t1|X = P
t2
|X ≡ P|X and P t1η|Y = P t2η|Y ≡ Pη|Y .
The null of the test is
H0 : D(Φt1)−D(Φt2) = 0. (30)
It maintains that there have been no changes in the agents’ preferences for assortativeness
across the two matching markets considered. Thus, it hypothesises that the observed
changes in matching patterns over time are simply caused by changes in the marginal
probability distributions of the agents across education categories.29
Mimicking the profiled subsampling procedure illustrated by Romano and Shaikh
29We refer the reader to Section III of CSW for a detailed explanation on how (30) allows Φt1 and
Φt2 to be related through additively separable time-specific drifts.
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(2008) and discussed in Section 5 , we propose the following test statistic30
TSnt1 ,nt2 ≡ inf
Ut1 , Vt1 , Ut2 , Vt2
{G¯Ut1 ,Ut2∆|x }∀x∈X
{G¯Vt1 ,Vt2∆η|y }∀y∈Y
∑
t∈{t1,t2}
nt ×
[ ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y0
(
mˆtM,n,x,y(G¯
Ut1 ,Ut2
∆|x )
)2
+
∑
(x,y)∈X0×Y
(
mˆtW,n,x,y(G¯
Vt1 ,Vt2
∆η|y )
)2]
s.t. Ut1 ∈ U†, Ut2 ∈ U†, Vt1 ∈ V†, Vt2 ∈ V†,
{G¯Ut1 ,Ut2∆|x , G¯
Vt1 ,Vt2
∆η|y } ∈ SUt1 ,Ut2 ,Vt1 ,Vt2 ,x,y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
Ut1 + Vt1 = Φt1 , Ut2 + Vt2 = Φt2 ,
D(Φt1)−D(Φt2) = 0,
under the null hypothesis. We use subsampling in order to obtain a critical value,
cˆnt1 ,nt2 ,1−α, with α ∈ (0, 1). The test rejects at level α if TSnt1 ,nt2 > cˆnt1 ,nt2 ,1−α.
We first test H0 under the assumption that the conditional probability distributions
of the taste shock differences have marginals symmetric about zero. Also, we impose
the location normalisations in (22) and (23), but proceed without scale normalisations.
Indeed, we remind the reader that the location and scale normalisations in (22) and (23)
are imposed on the vectors Ut1 , Vt1 , Ut2 , Vt2 which are equilibrium objects (and, hence,
they can vary across markets when P t1X 6= P t2X and/or P t1Y 6= P t2Y , even if Φt1 = Φt2), and
not primitive parameters. While the location normalisations are differenced out in (30),
the scale normalisations may induce the analyst to wrongly reject H0, for example when
Φt1 = Φt2 but P t1X 6= P t2X and/or P t1Y 6= P t2Y . Avoiding scale normalisations reduces the
computational speed of the testing procedure by increasing the cardinality of U † and V†,
but the test remains valid. The test does not reject H0 at level α = 0.95. This means that
there might have been no changes in the agents’ preferences for assortativeness across the
two matching markets considered. Hence, the observed changes in matching patterns
over time could be simply caused by changes in the marginal probability distributions of
the agents across education categories. Such a conclusion is robust to various number
of subsamples (Bnt = 50, 100, 300 for each matching market t ∈ {t1, t2}) and various
subsample sizes (bnt =
⌈
5
6nt
⌉
,
⌈
nt
2
⌉
,
⌈
nt
3
⌉
,
⌈
nt
4
⌉
,
⌈
nt
6
⌉
for each matching market t ∈ {t1, t2}),
with subsamples drawn with or without replacements. In particular, the test statistic is
equal to 175.041, while the critical value takes value between 487.517 and 1452.461 across
the various subsampling schemes attempted. The results just discussed differ from CSW
which reject H0 at level α = 0.95 under the Gumbel assumption.
To see whether a rejection outcome can be obtained in our setting, we test H0 under
stronger nonparametric distributional restrictions on the taste shocks differences. Specif-
ically, we assume that (i) the conditional probability distributions of the taste shock dif-
30For each matching market t ∈ {t1, t2}, for simplicity of notation we assume that the analyst has the
same number of observations, nt, from each side of the market.
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ferences have marginals identical and symmetric about zero, and (ii) the 2-dimensional
vectors of taste shock differences which are relevant for each type choice are identically
distributed conditional on the agents’ types. As discussed above, we impose the loca-
tion normalisations in (22) and (23), but proceed without scale normalisations. The test
now rejects H0 at level α = 0.95, in line with CSW. This means that there have been
changes in the agents’ preferences for assortativeness across the two matching markets
considered. Such a result serves as a sensitivity check of the result in CSW. Further,
our result is robust to various number of subsamples (Bnt = 50, 100, 300 for each match-
ing market t ∈ {t1, t2}) and various subsample sizes (bnt =
⌈
5
6nt
⌉
,
⌈
nt
2
⌉
,
⌈
nt
3
⌉
,
⌈
nt
4
⌉
,
⌈
nt
6
⌉
for
each matching market t ∈ {t1, t2}), with subsamples drawn with or without replacements.
In particular, the test statistic is equal to 8195.558, while the critical value takes value
between 2253.917 and 6653.370 across the various subsampling schemes attempted.
7 Conclusions
In recent times, there has been a surge in the application of empirical matching models.
Thus, it is crucial to understand what drives their identification, as robustly as possible.
This paper is an attempt in that direction. In particular, we focus on the one-to-one TU
matching model of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2015). When the
analyst has data on one large market, we study identification of the preference parameters
without imposing parametric restrictions on the probability distribution of the agents’
unobserved characteristics. We provide a tractable procedure to characterise and conduct
inference on the sharp identified set for the preference parameters, under various classes
of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the agents’ unobserved characteristics.
Simulations suggest that the model is informative about the preference parameters un-
der various classes of nonparametric distributional restrictions on the agents’ unobserved
characteristics. Lastly, we use our methodology to empirically investigate if the variations
in marriage matching patterns observed over time in the U.S. are caused by changes in the
agents’ preferences for education assortativeness, or by changes in the marginal probabil-
ity distributions of the agents’ types. Under a symmetry restriction on the marginals of
the taste shock differences, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the matching
preferences have been invariant over time. Instead, when we impose stronger nonpara-
metric distributional assumptions on the latent variables, we reject such a null. We
leave to future work similar robust identification and inference exercises applied to other
matching frameworks.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 As mentioned in the main text, we refer the reader to Galichon
and Salanié (2015) for the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2 As mentioned in the main text, we refer the reader to Theorem
1 in Torgovitsky (2018) for the proof of Proposition 2 and to Assumption A in Torgovitsky
(2018) for an accurate list of the nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste
shock differences that can be accommodated.
Proof of Proposition 3 The proof is organised in the following steps. In step 0 we
introduce some new notation which is helpful to formalise our arguments. In step 1 we
present the notion of equivalence class for every U ∈ U † and prove that if U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †
belong to the same equivalence class, then they have the same solution to the linear
programming problem of Proposition 2 at a given x ∈ X . In step 2 we show how such
equivalence classes are related to the subsets U †1,x, ...,U †Kx,x of Proposition 3. In steps 3,
4, and 5 we prove that U †1,x, ...,U †Kx,x constitute a partition of U †, they are finite, and
convex.
For simplicity of exposition, we provide the proof of Proposition 3 referring to the
linear programming problem (19). The proof for a generic case follows exactly the same
steps, but becomes notationally more complicated.
Step 0 Let x ∈ X and U ∈ U †. List the 4 elements of the set Ax,j(U) in a row vector,
αx,U,j, for j = 1, 2, 3.31
Let
Π1 ≡ {(i, j, k, l) : (i, j, k, l) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}4, i 6= j 6= k 6= l},
Π2 ≡ {(<,<,<), (<,<,=), (<,=, <), (<,=,=), (=, <,<), (=, <,=), (=,=, <), (=,=,=)}.
Let pi : R¯4 → Π1 × Π2 where pi(α) ≡ (pi1(α), pi2(α)). pi1(α) sorts the 4 elements of α
from smallest to largest and reports their positions in the original vector. pi2(α) reports
the relational operators, < or =, among the sorted elements of α. When α contains
multiple elements with the same value, then we adopt any convention on which element
to sort first. E.g., pi(100, 99,∞,−∞) = {(4, 2, 1, 3), (<,<,<)} and pi(5, 5,∞,−∞) =
{(4, 1, 2, 3), (<,=, <)}. Call pi(α) the “pi-ordering” of α.
Consider the function G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R introduced in Section 3.2.1. Let G¯U∆|x(Ax(U))
denote the image set of this function. Recall that G¯U∆|x(Ax(U)) is a finite set because
Ax(U) is a finite set.32 List the 43 elements of G¯U∆|x(Ax(U)) in a column vector, gx,U .
31Recall that 43 is the cardinality of Ax(U) in the linear programming problem (19) when also possibly
repeated elements in Ax,j(U) for j = 1, 2, 3 are counted.
32As discussed for Ax(U) in Footnote 31, the cardinality of G¯U∆|x(Ax(U)) is also 43.
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Observe that solving the linear programming problem (19) can be equivalently viewed as
finding gx,U whose elements satisfy a collection of linear constraints.
Define a function ι : G¯U∆|x(Ax(U)) → {1, 2, ..., 43}, where ι(k) is the row index of
scalar k in the column vector gx,U .
List the 43 elements of the set Ax(U) in a column vector of 3-tuples, ax,U . ax,U can
be viewed as a 43 × 3 matrix. Reorder the matrix ax,U lexicographically by row and call
the reordered matrix aLx,U .33
Define a function τ : Ax(U)→ {1, 2, ..., 43}, where τ(k) is the row index of 3-tuple k
in the matrix aLx,U .
Step 1 Let x ∈ X and U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. Define
Cx(U˜) ≡
{
{(t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)} : (t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′) ∈ Ax(U˜), (t˜, q˜, r˜) ≤ (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)
}
,
Cx(Uˆ) ≡
{
{(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)} : (tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′) ∈ Ax(Uˆ), (tˆ, qˆ, rˆ) ≤ (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)
}
.
Definition 3. (Equivalence class) Let U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. Uˆ is said to belong to the equivalence
class of U˜ at x ∈ X if the following two conditions hold:
1. For every {(t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)} ∈ Cx(U˜), there exists {(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)} ∈ Cx(Uˆ) such
that
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜, q˜, r˜)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′, q˜, r˜)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′, qˆ, rˆ)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜, q˜′, r˜)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ, qˆ′, rˆ)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′, q˜′, r˜)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜, q˜, r˜′)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ′)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′, q˜, r˜′)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′, qˆ, rˆ′)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜, q˜′, r˜′)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ, qˆ′, rˆ′)),
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)) = ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)),
and viceversa.
2. pi2(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi2(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3.
Let [U˜ ]x denote the equivalence class of U˜ at x ∈ X . 
33For example, suppose that Ax(U) contains three 3-tuples (instead of 43 3-tuples, for shortness of
exposition): (3, 1, 2), (2, 3, 4), (2, 1, 3). Then,
aLx,U ≡
2 1 32 3 4
3 1 2
 .
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Lemma A.1. Let x ∈ X and U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. If Uˆ ∈ [U˜ ]x, then U˜ and Uˆ induce the same
solution to the linear programming problem (19) at x ∈ X . 
Proof. Let x ∈ X and U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. Suppose Uˆ ∈ [U˜ ]x. Take any {(t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)} ∈
Cx(U˜) and a corresponding {(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)} ∈ Cx(Uˆ) such that conditions 1 and 2 of
Definition 3 hold. Consider constraint (20)34 at {U˜ , (t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)}, where the terms of
the form G¯U˜∆|x(·) are unknown parameters to be determined. Relabel them as θι(G¯U˜∆|x(·)).
Then, restate (20) as
− θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜,q˜,r˜))
+ θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′,q˜,r˜))
+ θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜,q˜′,r˜))
− θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′,q˜′,r˜))
+ θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜,q˜,r˜′))
− θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′,q˜,r˜′))
− θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜,q˜′,r˜′))
+ θ
ι(G¯U˜∆|x(t˜′,q˜′,r˜′))
≥ 0,
(A.1)
where θ is a 43 × 1 vector of unknowns and θh denotes the h-th element of θ. Similarly,
consider the following relabelled constraint corresponding to Uˆ ,
− θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ,qˆ,rˆ))
+ θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′,qˆ,rˆ))
+ θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ,qˆ′,rˆ))
− θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′,qˆ′,rˆ))
+ θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ,qˆ,rˆ′))
− θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′,qˆ,rˆ′))
− θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ,qˆ′,rˆ′))
+ θ
ι(G¯Uˆ∆|x(tˆ′,qˆ′,rˆ′))
≥ 0.
(A.2)
By condition 1 of Definition 3, the subscripts of θ in (A.1) and (A.2) are identical. Further,
if some or all of the components of (t˜, q˜, r˜) are equal to (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′), then condition 2 of
Definition 3 ensures that the same is true across (tˆ, qˆ, rˆ) and (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′). Therefore, (A.1)
and (A.2) are identical. Similar arguments can be repeated for every {(t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)} ∈
Cx(U˜) and {(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)} ∈ Cx(Uˆ) so that U˜ and Uˆ generate the same constraints of
the type (20).
If U˜ and Uˆ generate the same constraints of the type (20), then they induce the same
solution to the linear programming problem (19) at x ∈ X . This is because the only
piece of (19) that can potentially generate different solutions for different values of U is
the one requiring the function G¯U∆|x : Ax(U)→ R to be 3-increasing.
Step 2
Lemma A.2. Let x ∈ X and U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. If
i. pi1(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi1(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3,
ii. pi2(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi2(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3,
then Uˆ ∈ [U˜ ]x. 
Proof. Condition ii of Lemma A.2 coincides with condition 2 of Definition 3. Therefore,
in what follows we show that conditions i and ii of Lemma A.2 imply condition 1 of
Definition 3.
34Refer to equation in the main text.
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Let x ∈ X . Let U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U † such that pi(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3. Take
any {(t˜, q˜, r˜), (t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)} ∈ Cx(U˜), i.e., a comparable pair of 3-tuples from Ax(U˜). Pick
(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′) ∈ Ax(Uˆ) such that τ((tˆ, qˆ, rˆ)) = τ((t˜, q˜, r˜)) and τ((tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)) = τ((t˜′, q˜′, r˜′)).
Given that pi1(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi1(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3, it should be that {(tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′)} ∈
Cx(Uˆ). That is, by construction, (tˆ, qˆ, rˆ), (tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ′) should be a comparable pair of 3-tuples
from Ax(Uˆ). Moreover, given pi1(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi1(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3, it should be that
τ((t˜′, q˜, r˜)) = τ((tˆ′, qˆ, rˆ)),
τ((t˜, q˜′, r˜)) = τ((tˆ, qˆ′, rˆ)),
τ((t˜′, q˜′, r˜)) = τ((tˆ′, qˆ′, rˆ)),
τ((t˜, q˜, r˜′)) = τ((tˆ, qˆ, rˆ′)),
τ((t˜′, q˜, r˜′)) = τ((tˆ′, qˆ, rˆ′)),
τ((t˜, q˜′, r˜′)) = τ((tˆ, qˆ′, rˆ′)).
Construct a 43× 3 new matrix, where the first, second, and third columns are defined
as
140 ⊗
[
(pi1(αx,U˜ ,1))T ⊗ 142
]
,
141 ⊗
[
(pi1(αx,U˜ ,2))T ⊗ 141
]
,
142 ⊗
[
(pi1(αx,U˜ ,3))T ⊗ 140
]
,
respectively, with 1d denoting the d-dimensional vector of ones. Reorder this new ma-
trix lexicographically by row and call the reordered matrix bx,U˜ . Observe that bx,U˜ is a
standardised relabelling of the matrix aL
x,U˜
.35 Construct the matrix bx,Uˆ in a similar way.
Note that pi1(αx,U˜ ,j) = pi1(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3 implies bx,U˜ = bx,Uˆ . Further, pi2(αx,U˜ ,j) =
pi2(αx,Uˆ ,j) for j = 1, 2, 3 ensures that bx,U˜ and bx,Uˆ are also logically equivalent. Therefore,
it must be that condition 1 of Definition 3 is satisfied.
Let x ∈ X and U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 imply that if αx,U˜ ,j and αx,Uˆ ,j
have the same pi-ordering for j = 1, 2, 3 (or, equivalently, if U˜ and Uˆ induce the same
pi-ordering), then U˜ and Uˆ generate the same solution to the linear programming problem
(19) at x ∈ X .
Step 3 Let x ∈ X . The equivalence classes introduced in Definition 3 satisfy the
following properties:
I. (Reflexivity) For any U ∈ U †, U ∈ [U ]x.
35The matrix bx,U abstracts from the magnitudes of the elements of aLx,U and captures their relative
positions.
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II. (Symmetry) For any U˜ , Uˆ ∈ U †, if U˜ ∈ [Uˆ ]x, then Uˆ ∈ [U˜ ]x.
III. (Transitivity) For any U˜ , Uˆ , U ∈ U †, if U˜ ∈ [Uˆ ]x and Uˆ ∈ [U ]x, then U˜ ∈ [U ]x.
Therefore, the equivalence classes introduced in Definition 3 partition U † in mutually
disjoint subsets (Theorem 1.1.1, Herstein, 1975).
This partition of U † is the most efficient (or, the coarsest) partition, in the sense that
it allows us to run the linear programming problem (19) at x ∈ X the least number
of times. However, tractably characterising this partition is not easy. Hence, in what
follows, we provide a less efficient (or, finer) partition which, on the other hand, have
appealing computational features.
By Lemma A.2, any subset of U † which induce the same pi-ordering will be in turn
a subset of some equivalence class [U ]x. For any equivalence class [U ]x, let U˜ , Uˆ ∈ [U ]x.
We say that U˜ ∼ Uˆ if U˜ and Uˆ induce the same pi-ordering. Note that ∼ is reflexive,
symmetric, and transitive. Thus, every [U ]x is partitioned into mutually disjoint subsets
of pi-orderings by Theorem 1.1.1 in Herstein (1975). This is the finer partition of U † we
refer to above.
The subsets of U † inducing the same pi-ordering will be called “partitioning subsets” of
U † henceforth. Let Kx denote the number of possible pi-orderings and, hence, the number
of partitioning subsets of U †. We denote the partitioning subsets of U † by U †1,x, ...,U †Kx,x.
Step 4 Let x ∈ X . Let lj be the length of the row vector αx,U,j for j = 1, ..., d.36 Note
that
Kx ≤ Πdj=1[(lj − 2)!× 2lj−1−2] <∞,
where (lj−2)! is the number of permutations of the elements of αx,U,j without considering
∞,−∞ whose sorted position is fixed, and 2lj−1−2 is the number of possible relational op-
erators between the elements of αx,U,j accounting for the fact that −∞ is always followed
by < and ∞ is always preceded by <. Therefore, Kx is finite.
Step 5 Let x ∈ X . We now prove that U †k,x is convex ∀k ∈ {1, ..., Kx}. Let U˜ and Uˆ
belong to the same partitioning subset, U †k,x, for some k ∈ {1, ..., Kx}. Note that, for any
U ∈ U †, the elements of Ax,j(U) are linear functionals of the elements of U for j = 1, 2, 3.
Denote any two such linear functionals by T and T ′. Hence, without loss of generality, if
T (U˜) < T ′(U˜) and T (Uˆ) < T ′(Uˆ), then
T (βU˜+(1−β)Uˆ) = βT (U˜)+(1−β)T (Uˆ) < βT ′(U˜)+(1−β)T ′(Uˆ) = T ′(βU˜+(1−β)Uˆ),
36Recall that lj = 4 and d = 3 in the linear programming problem (19). Also, note that he length of
the row vector αx,U,j does not vary with U, x.
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for any β ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
[βU˜ + (1− β)Uˆ ] ∈ U †k,x,
for any β ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, U †k,x is convex ∀k ∈ {1, ..., Kx}.
Proof of Proposition 4 For simplicity of exposition, we provide the proof of Proposi-
tion 4 when r = 2 (d = 3). The proof for a generic r follows exactly the same steps, but
becomes notationally more complicated.
Step 1 As highlighted in the main text, we should firstly observe that
B ≡ {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b3 = b1 − b2} = {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b1 = b2 + b3}.
Accordingly, the relevant 3-dimensional boxes defined in Proposition 4 are
B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x > bˆ+ b˜, y ≤ bˆ, z ≤ b˜},
Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x ≤ bˆ+ b˜, y > bˆ, z > b˜},
for any (bˆ, b˜) ∈ R2.
Step 2 Let Q ⊂ R denote the set of rational numbers. We now show that
∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜) = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x > y + z} ≡ A1.
It is clear that ∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜) ⊆ A1. To prove the reverse, take any (x, y, z) ∈ A1
and  ≡ x − (y + z) > 0. Since Q is dense in R, there exists p ∈ [y, y + 2 ] ∩ Q and
q ∈ [z, z + 2 ] ∩ Q. Therefore, x = y + z +  > p + q and, hence, (x, y, z) ∈ B1,2,3(p, q).
Thus, A1 ⊆ ∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜).
Step 3 By following the same arguments of step 2, we can show that
∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜) = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x < y + z} ≡ A2.
Step 4 Assume P∆|X(B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = P∆|X(Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = 0 ∀(bˆ, b˜) ∈ Q2. Hence, by
step 3, A1 and A2 are disjoint and infinitely countable unions of zero probability measure
sets. Note that Bc = A1 ∪ A2, where Bc denotes the complement of the region B in R3.
Therefore, P∆|X(Bc) = P∆|X(A1 ∪ A2) = 0, which is equivalent to P∆|X(B) = 1.
Step 5 Conversely, assume P∆|X(B) = 1. This implies P∆|X(∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = 0
and P∆|X(∪(bˆ,b˜)∈Q2Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = 0. In turn, P∆|X(B1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = P∆|X(Q1,2,3(bˆ, b˜)) = 0
∀(bˆ, b˜) ∈ Q2.
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B More on inference
This section illustrates how the optimisation problem (28) can be rewritten as a mixed
integer quadratic programming. To keep the exposition readable, we continue focusing on
the case r = 2 (d = 3) of Example 1. All the arguments can be immediately generalised
to any r.
As explained in the main text, the mixed integer feature is because, ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×Y ,
the constraints in SU,V,x,y requiring G¯U∆|x and G¯V∆η|y to be 3-increasing functions are rele-
vant only for comparable 3-tuples in Ax(U) and Ay(V ), and therefore, they are nonlinear
in U and V . Such nonlinear constraints can be incorporated into the problem using
auxiliary binary variables via the big-M modelling approach (e.g., Williams, 2013).
More precisely, consider the men’s side and take the collection of constraints in (19)
requiring G¯U∆|x to be a 3-increasing function for a given x ∈ X :
− G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r)
+ G¯U∆|x(t, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r′) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r′) ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax(U) s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′).
(B.1)
(B.1) can be rewritten as the following collection of constraints:
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax(U),
− (t, q, r) + (t′, q′, r′) ≥ (0, 0, 0)⇒ −G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r)
+ G¯U∆|x(t, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r′) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r′) ≥ 0.
(B.2)
As per Williams (2013), (B.2) is equivalent to
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax(U),
(I) − (t, q, r) + (t′, q′, r′) ≤M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) × (λ1,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ2,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ3,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′)),
(II) δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) ≥ 1 + λ1,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) + λ2,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) + λ3,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) − 3,
(III) − G¯U∆|x(t, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r) + G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r)
+ G¯U∆|x(t, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t′, q, r′)− G¯U∆|x(t, q′, r′) + G¯U∆|x(t′, q′, r′) ≥ −M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′)(1− δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′)),
(B.3)
where λ1,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ2,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ3,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) are binary variables and
M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) is chosen as small as possible37 but such that
M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) ≥ 4, (B.4)
− (t, q, r) + (t′, q′, r′) ≤M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) ∀U ∈ U †. (B.5)
37M(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) unnecessarily large induces bad numerics in solvers and makes harder to solve the
integer program.
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To see why (B.2) is equivalent to (B.3), note that
− (t, q, r) + (t′, q′, r′) > 0
⇓
λ1,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) = λ2,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) = λ3,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) = 1 so that (I) is satisfied by (B.5)
⇓
δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) = 1 so that (II) is satisfied
⇓
Desired constraint on the image set of G¯U∆|x is activated through (III),
and
− (t, q, r) + (t′, q′, r′) ≤ 0
⇓
λ1,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ2,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′), λ3,(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) can be 1 or 0 and, in any case, (I) is satisfied by (B.5)
⇓
δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) can take value 1 or 0
⇓
Desired constraint on the image set of G¯U∆|x are activated when δ(t,q,r),(t′,q′,r′) = 1;
otherwise (III) satisfied by (B.4).
The number “4” on the right hand side of (B.4) reflects the maximum value that the left
hand side of (III) in (B.3) can take. Similar steps can be replicated for the women’s side.
By using (B.3) in place of (B.1), one can rewrite the optimisation problem (28) as
a mixed integer quadratic programming. Let ΛM ,ΛW be the vectors of all the newly
introduced dummy variables for each side of the market. For each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , let
SU,V,ΛM ,ΛW ,x,y be the collection of pairs of functions G¯U∆|x : Ax(U) → R and G¯V∆η|y :
Ay(V ) → R which satisfy the constraints guaranteeing that G¯U∆|x is extendable to a
conditional CDF in G†∆|x, G¯V∆η|y is extendable to a conditional CDF in G†∆η|y, and such
conditional CDFs are concentrated on the region B, as discussed in Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.3. Then, (28) is equivalent to
TSn(Φ0) ≡ inf
U, V
ΛM ,ΛW
{G¯U∆|x}∀x∈X
{G¯V∆η|y}∀y∈Y
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y0
(√
nmˆM,n,x,y(G¯U∆|x)
)2
+
∑
(x,y)∈X0×Y
(√
nmˆW,n,x,y(G¯V∆η|y)
)2
s.t. U ∈ U†, V ∈ V†,
{G¯U∆|x, G¯V∆η|y} ∈ SU,V,ΛM ,ΛW ,x,y ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y,
U + V = Φ0,
which corresponds to a mixed integer quadratic programming.
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